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Abstract
On the day before Brazil was to start imposing retaliatory sanctions against the US in the
WTO dispute settlement case regarding unfair domestic and export upland cotton subsidies,
the parties have reached a preliminary concession aimed at settling this 8-year-long trade
dispute. In this paper, we explore the economy wide impacts of a no deal with specic
emphasis on intellectual property retaliation in a computable general equilibrium framework.
As awarded by a WTO dispute settlement panel, Brazil would have been entitled to $591
million in retaliatory sanctions in goods sectors and $238 million in intellectual property
sanctions. We nd that retaliation by Brazil would have led to welfare gains for all countries
except the US. Most importantly however, had Brazil not been allowed to retaliate in the
form of suspension of intellectual property rights, the impact of trade retaliation alone would
have been negative for both Brazil and the US, a case of shooting oneself in the foot to shoot
at the other person's foot.
JEL Classication: C68 F13 Q17
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Marinos Tsigas (USITC) for generously providing the US Input-Output data at the disaggregated level.1 Introduction
In September 2002, the government of Brazil initiated consultations with the United States
under the dispute settlement procedures of the World Trade Organization (WTO) claiming that
various provisions of the US cotton programme were in violation of WTO obligations (WTO,
2002). The contested measures included certain domestic and export subsidies provided to US
producers, users and exporters of upland cotton1.
After unsuccessful consultations, in September 2004 a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel found
in favour of Brazil (WTO, 2004). Following a failed appeal in March 2005, the US was required
to implement changes in its policies of the cotton programme. Later, in December 2007 a
compliance panel arrived at the conclusion that the US had not fully complied with previous
WTO recommendations. As a result, at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) meeting in March
2009, Brazil claimed the right to impose $2.5 billion in retaliatory sanctions against the US in
the form of the suspension of tari concessions and cross-retaliation in the form of suspension of
intellectual property obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).
Finally, in September 2009 the Panel granted Brazil the right to impose sanctions worth
$294.7 million (2006 base-year). In 2008 gures, this was equivalent to $829 million in sanctions
against the United States. In April 2009, Brazil published a list of 102 US products that would
be subject to retaliatory taris worth $591 million and a list of 21 proposed intellectual property
sanctions up to $238 million.
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism allows for countermeasures to be imposed against
a member country that has been proved to be in violation of WTO rules and obligations.
According to the WTO dispute settlement rules, retaliation should be equivalent to the level of
damage and should concern the same sector whenever practicable.
Cross-retaliation as a concept has not been directly dened in any of the WTO's dispute
settlement articles, but it refers to the situation where the initiating country suspends concessions
or other obligations under a sector or an agreement that are not the subject of the dispute. Cross-
retaliation is an instrument that is authorized in cases where the complaining country is able
to prove that retaliation in the same sector or agreement where the violation occurred is not
practicable or eective.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) cross-retaliation entails the right of (developing) countries
to suspend their obligations under TRIPS if conventional methods prove to be inecient. When
compared to traditional market access retaliation, the suspension of IPR has proved to be an
1Upland cotton is dened as raw upland cotton and primary processed forms of such cotton including upland
cotton lint and cottonseed (WTO, 2004).
3eective negotiating instrument for developing countries to enforce compliance with the decisions
of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
In the specic case of the US-Brazil cotton dispute, Brazil argued that the suspension of
concessions exclusively under trade in goods was not practicable or eective since higher trade
barriers to Brazilian imports of U.S. goods would impose additional costs on the Brazilian
economy. Brazil pointed out that 95% of Brazil's imports from the U.S. comprise of capital
goods, intermediate goods and other essentials for the Brazilian economy. In addition 86% of
the imports of consumer goods correspond to medical supplies, food and automotive products.
The US-Brazil cotton case is not without precedence as cross-retaliation under TRIPS has
been authorized twice by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The rst request for the suspen-
sion of intellectual property rights came from Ecuador against the European Community (EC)
claiming that the EC's banana trading regime was in violation of certain aspects of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement of Trade in Services
(GATS). The arbitrators found in favour of Ecuador and permitted the suspension of obliga-
tions of TRIPS. In this case, the parties reached a settlement agreement before Ecuador was to
start implementing the retaliation. The second dispute settlement case involving a request for
the suspension of concessions under TRIPS was initiated by Antigua and Barbuda against the
US. Antigua claimed that US restrictions on cross-border gambling services were in violation of
GATS. The WTO arbitrators ruled in favour of Antigua and authorized suspension of TRIPS
obligations by Antigua. Up to the present, Antigua has not yet imposed sanctions nor has a
settlement been reached with the US.
With respect to the US-Brazil cotton dispute, on April 6, 2010, the day before Brazil was
to start imposing retaliatory sanctions, a preliminary deal with the US was reached. The deal
entailed $147 million a year for setting up an assistance fund for the cotton industry in Brazil
while US negotiators agreed to reevaluate the possibility of imports of fresh beef from Brazil.
The fact that in none of these disputes IPR cross-retaliation has actually been implemented
proves that the simple threat of IPR retaliation is serious enough to convince parties to reach
an agreement. Apart from the pressure of entertainment and pharmaceutical industries on the
national governments, it is expected that the economic costs of the suspension IPR concessions
may be substantial and widespread across the economy.
This paper examines those economic costs by exploring the economic impact of a no deal
in the US-Brazil cotton dispute using a global computable general equilibrium framework, the
GTAP model (Hertel, 1997). As awarded by a WTO dispute settlement panel, Brazil would
have been entitled to $591 million in retaliatory sanctions in the goods sectors and $238 million
in intellectual property and services sanctions.
While quantifying the impacts of trade retaliation does not pose any challenges, implementing
4IPR retaliation requires us to modify the underlying model. The framework we develop is unique
in the sense that it provides the possibility for quantifying intellectual property related issues in
a framework that is consistent with international accounting standards2 and general equilibrium.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the US-Brazil upland cotton
dispute. Section 3 provides a short summary of the economic analysis used in WTO dispute
arbitration. Section 4 presents our modelling framework, while Section 5 details the economic
impacts of a no deal. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Dispute DS267 - US Subsidies on Upland Cotton
Dispute DS267 initiated in September 2002 by Brazil (a major cotton exporter), found prohibited
and actionable subsidies on upland cotton3 imposed by US producers, users and exporters of
upland cotton. Brazil claimed that these subsidies were in violation of certain provisions of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), the Agreement on Agriculture
and Article III:4 of GATT 1994.
Cotton subsidies have proved to be a sensitive issue not only in dispute settlements, but
also in the current round of multilateral WTO negotiations4. The cotton market in developed
countries is subject to signicant subsidies that have resulted in the continued decrease in world
cotton prices (see Figure 1) to the detriment of cotton producers in the developing world.
In 1999 - the reference year of Brazil's complaint to the Dispute Settlement Body, - assistance
to cotton producers was highest in the United States ($3.4 billion) followed by China ($1.53
billion) and Greece ($0.59 billion). In the same year, the United States was the third biggest
cotton producer with $16.9 billion bales after China (17.6 billion bales) and India (12.1 billion
bales), but the largest exporter (6.75 billion bales), followed by China and Pakistan (Figure 2).
Cotton subsidies in the United States were introduced with the Agricultural Adjustment Act
in 1933 as a part of the commodity programs5. Main categories of cotton subsidies in the U.S.
include:
 Price based payments (marketing loan payments) provide support when market prices fall
2System of National Accounts (SNA) 1993.
3According to the SCM Agreement, subsidies can be categorized as prohibited (e.g. export subsidies and
local content subsidies) and actionable (e.g. production subsidies) that are not prohibited but subject to dispute
settlement or countervailing action.
4Four West African cotton exporters (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) referred to as the Cotton Four
(C-4) have introduced the Cotton Initiative demanding that the Doha Development Agenda include cutting cotton
subsidies and taris (WTO, 2003).
5Other covered commodities include wheat, feed grains, rice, soybeans and other oilseeds.
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Source: USDA Cotton and Wool Yearbook 2010
6Table 1: Budgetary transfers to the US cotton sector ($mil)
1992 1999 2000 2001 2002
Coupled payments 866 1,840 820 2,609 947
Direct payments 1,017 616 574 473 617
Countercyclical payments 0 613 612 654 1,309
Crop insurance payments 26 169 161 262 194
Step 2 payments 102 165 260 144 72
TOTAL 2,012 3,404 2,429 4,144 3,140
Source: WTO (2004)
below loan rates. Dierent forms include loan deciency payments (LDPs), marketing loan
gains (MLGs) and commodity certicates.
 Step 2 programme is a special marketing loan provided to exporters and end-users of
upland cotton in case domestic prices exceed world prices.
 Decoupled or direct payments (production exibility payments) are annual payments un-
related to production or market prices aimed at supporting producers based on historical
acreage and yields.
 Crop insurance is annual crop yield or revenue insurance coverage for losses due to natural
disasters or market uctuations.
 Countercyclical payments (formerly known as deciency payments) are automatic pay-
ments that make up for the dierence between lower market prices and a target price.
Measures contested by Brazil in DS267 included domestic and export subsidies to US up-
land cotton producers during 1999-2002; subsidies mandated to be provided during 2002-2007;
marketing loans; loan deciency payments; commodity certicates; direct payments; counter-
cyclical payments; i.e. virtually every type of domestic or export support measure to the US
cotton industry. Further, Brazil alleged that Step 2 payments (described above) functioned as
WTO prohibited export subsidies. Step 2 payments have been declared to the WTO as amber-
box6 domestic support payments and consequently not subject to any limitations concerning
export subsidies. Brazil also claimed that export credit guarantees7 (previously not considered
as export subsidies by the US) functioned as export subsidies as well.
6The amber-box contains domestic support measures considered to distort production and trade that countries
agreed to reduce but not eliminate.
7Insurance policy that protects an exporter against default by an importer.
7Brazil argued that these measures caused serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil (WTO,
2002) since the use of these measures lead to: 1) a signicant decline in the price of upland
cotton in Brazil and everywhere else during 1999-2002; 2) an increase in the world market share
of the US for upland cotton in 2001 and 3) a decrease/displacement of Brazilian exports of
cotton to the rest of the world. Finally, Brazil argued that the US was not eligible to be exempt
from the dispute settlement process under the "peace clause" of the Agreement on Agriculture
as total subsidies provided to the cotton industry were in excess of the 1992 benchmark (see
Table 1).
The dispute settlement panel (WTO, 2004) and the Appellate Body (WTO, 2005) of the DSB
arrived at the conclusion that export credit guarantees and the Step 2 programme qualied as
prohibited export subsidies in violation of WTO commitments and called for the their withdrawal
without delay.
As the US did not comply with rulings of the Panel within the given timeline, in March
2009 Brazil claimed the right to impose $2.5 billion in retaliatory sanctions against the US: $300
million compensation for the US Step 2 programme, $1.2 billion for the export credit guarantee
programme, and the remaining $1 billion for the marketing loan and countercyclical payments.
In addition Brazil claimed the right to suspend intellectual property obligations under TRIPS.
Finally, in September 2009 the Panel granted Brazil the right to impose trade sanctions worth
$294.7 million (2006 base-year) and the right to engage in IPR cross-retaliation.
In 2008 gures, Brazil would have been entitled to $829 millions in retaliatory sanctions
against the US, composed of:
 $591 millions in retaliatory taris in goods sectors and
 $238 millions in intellectual property and services sanctions8
With respect to trade retaliation, Brazil released a list of 102 U.S. products that would be
subject to higher taris. The exact list is presented in Table 7 in the Appendix. As direct
retaliation, cotton and cotton products face the highest tari increase from 6% to 100% for raw
cotton, and from 26% to 100% for certain cotton products. Cross-retaliatory taris cover a wide
range of sectors from agricultural products, processed food to electronics. Taris on agricultural
products such as wheat and certain fresh fruits (cherries, pears and plums) increased from 10%
to 30%. Several food sectors were also aected: taris on ketchup doubles from 18% to 38%
and on sugar-free chewing gum from 16% to 36%.
Concerning IPR retaliation, in February 2010 the Brazilian Government issued Provisional
Measure No. 482 containing details about the implementation of the IPR retaliation. The
document denes the following measures that could be undertaken: suspension of intellectual
8Note that, originally, there was no monetary value given for IPR cross-retaliation.
8property rights, limitation of intellectual property rights, change of measures for the implemen-
tation of standards of protection of intellectual property rights, change of measures for obtaining
and maintaining intellectual property rights and temporarily blocking the remittance of royalties
or compensation on the exercise of intellectual property rights.
On the day before Brazil was to start imposing retaliatory sanctions worth $829 millions,
a preliminary deal with the US has been reached on April 6, 2010. Finally, on June 17, 2010
the parties signed a Framework Agreement that requires the US to set up an assistance fund to
help Brazilian farmers worth $147.3 million per year while the US agreed to establish a limit on
trade distorting cotton subsidies.
3 The Economics of Retaliation
Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (WTO, 1995) governs the "Compensation
and the Suspension of Concessions" of the dispute resolution process of the WTO and it can be
summarized by four main principles:
 Parties are given the choice between compensation (undertaken by the respondent in the
form of lowering trade barriers) and retaliation (by the complainant in the form of re-
taliatory taris or suspension of other WTO obligations). As pointed out by Anderson
(2002), retaliation is usually preferred to compensation as it asserts more pressure on the
respondent to comply with WTO obligations.
 The level of retaliatory measures should be equivalent to the harm caused by the WTO
inconsistent measure to the complainant.
 The complainant should rst seek to suspend concession in the same sector in which the
violation occurred. If this proves to be not practicable or eective, retaliatory measures
can target other sectors.
 Retaliatory measures should be temporary and applied until the respondent complies with
WTO obligations.
In the specic case of DS267, Brazil had initially sought $2.5 billion in retaliatory sanctions
against the US, but was awarded only a small fraction, $294.7 million by WTO arbitrators.
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the theoretical framework for how reciprocal compensa-
tion is determined by WTO arbitrators in case of a WTO inconsistent export subsidy.
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Source: Bown and Ruta (2008)
1
0Suppose Figure 3 describes a domestic and international market for cotton (in a partial
equilibrium setting). There are two trading countries, Brazil and the United States. The supply
(SBRA and SUSA) and demand (DBRA and DUSA) curves for the two countries are shown in
panels A and C, respectively. At the initial equilibrium price P0 Brazil has excess demand
and the US has excess supply. The international market is described in panel B: at this initial
equilibrium Brazil's import demand curve is MBRA and the export supply curve of the US is
XUSAo. Brazil imports cotton from the US of Q0.
Assume that the US introduces Step 2 and export credit guarantees for cotton, - measures
determined by the WTO panel to function as prohibited export subsidies. As a result of the
export subsidy, US cotton producers export more leading to a downward shift in the export
supply curve to XUSA1. Excess supply in the international market for cotton causes prices
to fall to P1. At the same time, domestic cotton prices in the US increase to P2. At the new
equilibrium, Brazil imports Q1. As a result of the export subsidy, the market of the US increases
and world cotton prices fall hurting Brazilian cotton producers.
As pointed out above, based on the principle of equivalence, retaliation by Brazil has to equal
the damage caused by the prohibited export subsidy. More specically, permissible Brazilian
retaliation should correspond to the volume of distorted trade (Q1   Q0) at the original export
price P0, represented by the shaded area in Figure 3 (Bown and Ruta, 2008).
Now assume that Brazil choses to retaliate by introducing prohibitive taris against US
exports. Equation 1 denes the value of permissible retaliation under the principle of equivalence
(Bown and Ruta, 2008):
P0[Q0   Q1] = P0(Ret)[Q0   QRet(Ret)] (1)
or more specically, the value of distorted trade at initial prices (the left hand side of the
equation) has to equal the value of trade lost due to retaliatory taris Ret (the right hand side
of the equation).
While Equation 1 ensures equivalence between the harm caused to the reporting country
and the permissible retaliation in terms of value of trade, it does not by any means ensure
equivalence in terms of welfare eects (Anderson, 2002). More specically, the net loss of export
earnings is not equivalent with net welfare eects (except by coincidence) given that welfare
is a more comprehensive measure that includes not only terms of trade eects, but allocative
eciency, technological change eects, etc. Traditional trade retaliation has often been referred
to as equivalent to "shooting oneself in the foot" (especially in the case of developing countries).
It is thus not an eective and credible threat as it leads to a decline in welfare in the retaliating
country (Subramanian and Watal, 2000) and is therefore unlikely to be implemented.
11On the other hand, cross-retaliation under TRIPS in the form of suspension of intellectual
property obligations has proved to be both benecial for the retaliating country and is a credible
threat in forcing countries to comply with WTO obligations as it does not aect negatively the
retaliating country's welfare.
4 Modeling Framework
The framework we use for carrying out the analysis is the comparative static GTAP model
(Hertel, 1997). With respect to trade retaliation, this model is ready for implementing the
policy shocks9. However, for implementing IPR retaliation the model needs to be modied.
As a rst step, we identify the channels of impact of IPR retaliation.
From the consumers' point of view, IPR retaliation could lead to desirable consequences:
as opposed to trade retaliation where the consumer carries the burden of the price increase
for imported goods, the suspension of obligations under TRIPS could lead to an increase in
consumer welfare by increasing access to pharmaceutical products, education, entertainment
etc. through reduced price.
Finally, IPR retaliation will also have an impact on the remittance of royalties to right
holders. For instance in the case of the US-Brazil dispute, Brazil threatened to suspend the
transfer of royalty payments to Pzer and other pharmaceutical companies.
The following subsections describe the international accounting standards for quantifying
intellectual property and we present the extended GTAP model with explicit treatment of the
royalty services sector.
4.1 Quantifying Intellectual Property
The increasing knowledge-intensity of economic activities over the years has led to increased
interest in quantifying intellectual property, intangibles and innovation and their impact on the
economy. In spite of this interest, issues with data availability, quality and measurement of
intellectual property has prevented such analysis from being carried out. The following subsec-
tions give further details on the international accounting standards for quantifying intellectual
property and describe how intellectual property is present in Input-Output accounting and trade
data.
9Although the model could be further improved to endogenously match the exact amount of retaliation.
124.1.1 International accounting standards
The United Nations' System of National Accounts 1993 introduced important methodological
changes with respect to the measurement of intellectual property in macroeconomic accounts.
Accordingly, SNA 1993 states that it is necessary to distinguish between income received from li-
cencing or leasing-type transactions and income from the purchase or sale of intellectual property
assets.10 We thus dierentiate between the use of intellectual property related assets (recorded
under services-royalties and license fees) and the purchase or sale of intellectual property related
assets (recorded in the intangible assets category of the capital account).
In line with these recommendations, the IMF's Balance of Payments database contains two
entries with respect to royalty payments:
 In the current account under trade in services: "inclusion of this item under services, rather
than under income, is in accordance with the SNA treatment of such items as payments for
production of services for intermediate consumption or receipts from sales of output used as
intermediate inputs". Royalties and license fees in this case refers to receipts (exports) and
payments (imports) for the authorized use of trademarks, copyrights, patents, processes,
techniques, designs, manufacturing rights, franchises, etc.
 In the capital account referring to income payments or receipts from the sales of intangible
assets such as trademarks, copyrights etc.
To sum up, the purchase of all the rights of ownership of intellectual property assets is an
income ow, while the purchase of the right to use intellectual property is recorded as a service
transaction.
Note that the treatment of royalties and implicitly that of intellectual property (knowledge
capital) transactions is very dierent from how traditional capital inputs and the associated
foreign investment/foreign income are treated in the System of National Accounts. Thus, the
contribution capital inputs to the production is treated as capital service, a component of value
added, while royalties are treated as intermediate service input. Further, international capi-
tal mobility is not associated with movement across borders, as opposed to royalties that are
recorded as international services transactions. Finally, income from change in ownership are
recorded in the capital account for both.
4.1.2 Royalty services in Input-Output accounting
As international accounting standards require payments for the use of intellectual property or
royalties to be treated as payments for a service, we should nd that Input-Output accounts
10Previously all intellectual property transactions have been recorded as income ows.
13describe the supply and use of royalties as a sector. Indeed, at the most disaggregated level (498
industry detail), the United States' Input-Output accounts, separately identies and describes
the supply and use of the royalty services sector. In the North American Industrial Classication
System (NAICS) royalty and licensing income received by industries is described as a primary
activity, separated from the rest of the activities. NAICS 533, Lessors of non-nancial intangible
assets, is the industry that rents intellectual property such as trademarks, patents, brand-names
to the other industries.
We could not nd Input-Output tables of other countries that separately identify this sector,
thus the IO table of the US will serve as a base for the disaggregation of the GTAP sectoral
classication to include a royalty services sector. According to the GTAP database conventions,
we have to dene the supply of the royalty services sector and separately identify the domestic
and imported royalty services usage of royalty services by other sectors. Given that we use
the US IO table to disaggregate both the supply/use structure and the output structure of the
royalties sector in Brazil, it is possible that we overestimate the share of royalties in total Other
business services in Brazil.
For disaggregating trade ows we complement the information from the IO tables with
royalty services data from external data sources such as the BEA International Transactions
Accounts, EUROSTAT and the National Bank of Brazil.
Table 2 reports the top 15 shares in the composition of the supply and use of the royalty ser-
vices sector of the US as found at the most disaggregated level. We nd that sectors that consume
most royalty services are oil and gas extraction (25.3%), pharmaceutical and medicine manufac-
turing (4.7%) and food and drinking services (4.2%). These sectors correspond to GTAP sectors
Oil (OIL) and Gas (GAS), Chemical, rubber and plastic products (CRP) and Trade (TRD),
respectively. On the other hand, in the supply of the royalties sector non-comparable imports11
(45.2%), monetary authorities and depository credit intermediation12 (18%) and management
consulting services (8%) are the most signicant inputs. These sectors correspond to GTAP sec-
tors Recreational and other services (ROS), Financial services (OFI) and Other business services
(OBS), respectively.
11Noncomparable imports include expenditures on personal and business travel while abroad by U.S. residents,
royalties and license fees paid to foreign residents etc. This sector has no direct domestic counterpart.
12Establishments primarily engaged in accepting deposits and in lending funds from these deposits and per-
forming central bank operations.
14Table 2: The composition of the royalties sector in the US Input-Output table
Use Supply
Sector %* Sector %*
Oil and gas extraction 25.3% Noncomparable imports 45.2%
Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing 4.7% Monetary authorities and depository credit intermediation 18.0%
Food services and drinking 4.2% Management consulting serv. 8.0%
Retail trade 3.7% Couriers and messengers 5.9%
Automobiles 3.3% Nondepository credit intermediation and related activities 4.8%
Hotels 2.4% Business support services 3.4%
Wholesale trade 2.2% Management of companies and enterprises 1.9%
Telephone apparatus manufact. 2.0% Civic, social, professional and similar organizations 1.9%
Broadcast and wireless communications equipment 2.0% Services to buildings and dwellings 1.5%
Soft drink and ice manufact. 1.6% Paperboard container manufacturing 1.2%
Petroleum reneries 1.4% Paper and paperboard mills 1.1%
Home health care services 1.4% Coated and uncoated paper bag manufacturing 0.9%
Cigarette manufacturing 1.3% Other computer related serv. 0.9%
Semiconductor machinery manufact. 1.3% Employment services 0.8%
Motor vehicle parts manufact. 1.3% Securities, commodity contracts, investments 0.7%
Source: BEA U.S. Input-Output Data
*% of total use and supply, respectively.
1
54.2 Royalty Services in the GTAP Model
Based on our ndings described above, we model royalty services as a separate industry, similar
to any other production sector in the standard GTAP model.
Note that we do not describe the market for the purchase and sale of intellectual property
(capital account), but only the purchase and sale of use of intellectual property (services trade).
Implicitly we assume that IPR retaliation concerns royalty payments for the current use of
intellectual property assets.
The modelling framework used here is inherently static and short run in nature, that is
the suspension of IPR rights do not impact R&D incentives and there is no formation of new
knowledge. This limitation could be overcome by introducing dynamic features to describe
the formation of new knowledge, however we consider that a comparative static framework is
suitable for the carrying out the analysis at hand. The underlying assumption would imply
that the suspension of IPR rights does not impact on R&D incentives in the two countries, a
reasonable assumption given that royalty payments are waived only temporarily.
4.3 Simulation Design
The model is calibrated using version 8 pre-release 1 of the GTAP database which has a base
year of 2007. The 112 regions of the full database have been aggregated into 10 composite
ones while the 57 sectors have been originally aggregated into 21 sectors described in Table 8.
Finally, we disaggregated other business services (OBS) into royalty services (ROY) and business
services (OBO) using SplitCom, a set of programs developed by Horridge (2005) to facilitate
the addition of a sector to the GTAP database.
The implemented policy shocks correspond to the two main two areas of retaliation granted
to Brazil by the DSB: rst, countermeasures in trade in goods (trade retaliation) and second,
countermeasures on intellectual property rights (IPR retaliation).
With respect to trade retaliation, we refer the list of 102 U.S. products subject to higher
duties published by the Brazilian government (see Table 7) to dene the level of retaliatory taris.
We use TASTE (Horridge and Laborde, 2008) to aggregate product level (HS8) retaliatory
taris into sectors that correspond to the level of aggregation dened above13. Results of the
aggregation are presented in Table 3 below. As expected, we nd highest retaliatory taris
in the plant based bers sector (cotton) with an increase from 9.17% to 99.93%14. Further,
US exports of other agricultural goods to Brazil would be subject to a 334.69% hike of import
13Note that the sectoral aggregation has been developed such as to keep the maximum level of information
about the new tari structure as allowed by the GTAP database
14Aggregated taris have been calculated using bilateral trade weights.
16Table 3: Initial and retaliatory taris on US exports applied by Brazil (% AVE)
Initial Retaliatory % Dierence
Agriculture 1.96 8.52 334.69
Vegetables, fruits, nuts 11.15 24.08 115.96
Plant based bers 9.17 99.93 989.75
Mining 0.36 0.42 16.67
Food products 12.8 13.01 1.64
Vegetable oils 11.5 16.28 41.57
Milk products 22.52 33.34 48.05
Other food 13.42 20.27 51.04
Beverages and tobacco 21.78 21.83 0.23
Textiles 14.93 19.84 32.89
Wearing apparel 20.11 31.09 54.60
Manufacturing 7.28 7.39 1.51
Chemicals 9.68 10.29 6.30
Metal products 17.55 18.38 4.73
Motor vehicles 15.57 16.15 3.73
Transport equipment 3.54 3.59 1.41
Electronics 9.76 10.19 4.41
Other machienery 12.5 12.93 3.44
Other manufactures 18.58 20.5 10.33
Source: TASTE (Horridge and Laborde, 2008)
duties, followed by vegetable oils with 115.96% increase in taris. In addition, Brazil would
impose signicant retaliatory duties in manufacturing sectors such as wearing apparel (54.6%
increase) and other foods (51.04% increase). Overall, we nd that 21 of the 42 GTAP goods
sectors are impacted by increased taris.
Implementing intellectual property retaliation on the other hand is not straightforward. As
pointed out previously, our modelling framework is short run in nature: the suspension of IPR
obligations do not impact R&D incentives and we exclude dynamic eects due to the temporary
nature of the shock.
As a short run eect, Brazilian rms and consumers are entitled to refuse payment of royalties
and license fees to US intellectual property holders. By assumption, IPR retaliation would entail
17a decline of royalty services exports from US to Brazil implemented as a decline in the fob export
price of royalties. Note that the amount of IPR retaliation awarded to Brazil amounted to $231
millions, or 17.23% of $1,381 million total royalties exports from US to Brazil. Consequently,
the corresponding shock is a -17.23% decline in the export price of royalties from US to Brazil.
To implement IPR retaliation, we need to introduce adjustments to the model closure. As a
rst step, we exogenize the fob export price of royalties from the US to Brazil while any resulting
negative rents are borne by the US representative household. As in McDonald and Walmsley
(2008) we use rents similar to export tax equivalents to be able to track these rent associated
with IPR retaliation and to dierentiate them from tari revenues.
Further, we set the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported royalty services
(ESUBD) and the elasticity of substitution between imported royalty services (ESUBM) equal
to zero. The underlying assumption for the Leontief technology implemented can be explained
by the fact that royalties are usually paid on a per unit basis, that is if the demand of goods
using royalties inputs increases then the import quantity of royalties should increase as well.
Finally, the quantity of royalty exports is endogenous and allowed to respond to the price
decline: we assume that given that Brazilian rms already have the IP, reducing the export
price of royalties will increase the supply of goods that use royalties as an input. Consequently,
Brazil pays more royalties to the US although at a lower price.
5 Impacts of a No Deal
On the day before Brazil was to start imposing retaliatory sanctions worth $829 million against
the US, the parties reached a preliminary agreement on April 6, 2010 and signed a Memorandum
of Understanding two weeks later. Although Brazil initially claimed that the harm caused by
prohibited domestic and export cotton subsidies in the US is equivalent to $2.5 billion, the nal
Framework Agreement signed on July 16, 2010 awarded Brazil $147 million yearly assistance
fund for the Brazilian cotton industry, only a small fraction (5%) of Brazil's initial claim.
This section discusses the impacts of a no-deal between Brazil and the US on trade ows,
producers, consumers and welfare.
5.1 Impact on Trade Flows
Figure 4 depicts changes in exports between the US and Brazil (percentage and volume), for
both trade and IPR retaliation.




























































































































































































































































































Result represent changes for trade and IPR retaliation implemented separately.
1
9It is no surprise that imposing higher import taris on US exports by Brazil leads to a
decrease in trade between the two countries. As argued before, the sectors most impacted by
retaliatory taris are cotton (PFB), agriculture, fruits and vegetables and the textile industry.
Indeed, we nd that as a result of trade retaliation exports of cotton from US to Brazil almost
disappear (-93.3%). Other US exports to Brazil impacted most signicantly are wearing apparel
(-47.2%), raw milk (-45.2%), fruits and vegetables (-32.9%) and agriculture (-27.1%).
In volume terms, trade retaliation changes the ordering of the most signicantly impacted
sectors. Exports of chemicals (CRP) from US to Brazil decrease by -$170.1 million, followed
by machinery (OME) with -$125.6 millions and electronics with -$43.8 millions. Although, in
percentage terms we nd an almost 100% decrease in US exports of cotton (PFB) to Brazil, this
translates to a -$41.1 million decrease.
The impact on trade retaliation on Brazilian exports is moderate. Thus we nd a decrease of
manufacturing (MANUF) to the US by -$8.3 million followed by exports of machinery (OME)
with a fall of -$4.5 million.
Interestingly, we note that trade retaliation conform to the list of 102 products subject to
higher taris published by the Brazilian government leads to a decrease of -$554.1 million in the
exports from US to Brazil in the goods sector - an amount that is very close to that awarded to
Brazil by WTO arbitrators of $591 million15.
As shown in Figure 4, the impact of the IPR retaliation on US-Brazil trade ows is relatively
small. First of all, exports of royalties from US to Brazil increase by $1.79 million: as a result
of the lower export price sell more units of the goods that use IP as an input and thus pay more
royalties to the US. Most negatively impacted exports from Brazil to the US are manufactures
that fall by -$14.49 million, of machinery by -$7.63 million and that transportation equipment
by -$5.11 million. On the other hand, exports from US to Brazil increase mainly in sectors such
as machinery and equipment by $5.43 million, transportation equipment by $3.2 million and
chemicals by $3.16 million.
Figure 5 details changes in the volume of bilateral exports between all countries. Apart
from the changes in bilateral exports between US and Brazil already discussed above, we nd
that while Brazil imports less from the US, it imports from more from all other regions (most
signicantly from EU27 by $136.6 million and the rest of South America by $73.4 million). At
the same time, Brazil exports less not only to the US, but to all other regions. The case of the
US is exactly the opposite: while it exports less to Brazil, it exports more and imports less from
all other regions.
15Dierences would arise also due to that fact that the amount awarded by the WTO refers to 2008, while we
calibrate our model on 2007 data.































































































































1To sum up, this section does not bring forward any surprises with respect to the impact of
trade retaliation on trade ows. However, it is interesting to see that the impact of the trade
retaliation on trade ows resulting from this CGE framework is very close to the retaliatory
amount awarded by WTO.
5.2 Impact on Consumers and Producers
Although retaliation is aimed at impacting trade ows, it has an indirect impact on all agents of
the domestic economies of participating countries such as producers, consumers and government.
Accordingly, Tables 4 and 5 depict changes in the volume of private consumption and output
by sector for the US and Brazil decomposed into the impact of both trade and IPR retaliation.
Overall, consumers in the US are negatively impacted as private consumption falls by -
$338 million mainly driven by the signicant fall in consumption of services of -$224.5 million.
As shown in Table 4, IPR retaliation hurts US consumers more than trade retaliation, most
importantly with respect to services where trade retaliation leads to a fall in consumption by
-$52.9 million while IPR retaliation results in a fall of services consumption of -$171.5 million.
On the other hand, consumers in Brazil benet from retaliatory measures against the US.
More specically, in Brazil private consumption of most goods and services increases adding up
to an overall $147 million: consumption of services increases the most by 84.8 million. If we
decompose these changes into changes by origin (domestic and imported goods), we nd that
Brazilian consumers increase their consumption of domestic goods, while that of imported goods
decreases. Further, as depicted in Table 4, the overall positive impact on Brazilian consumers
result from the positive impact of IPR retaliation that overcome the negative impacts of trade
retaliation. More specically, we note that trade retaliation decreases private consumption of
most goods and services most signicantly that of other food products (-$4.03 million). In
contrast, IPR retaliation positively impacts private consumption in Brazil most signicantly
that of services ($88 million).
The impact of Brazil's retaliation plan on output is dierent. Overall, manufacturing
(MANUF), food and agriculture and transport equipment are among the most negatively im-
pacted in Brazil while total output decreases by -$180.4 million. On the other hand, total output
in the US increases by $172.7 million.
We note that trade retaliation increases the price of imported intermediates in Brazil and as
a result output decreases. As shown in Table 5, trade retaliation negatively impacts the output
of several sectors in Brazil most importantly that of services ($-38.5 million) and manufactures
($-32.9 million).
Finally, we focus on the impact of IPR retaliation on output in Brazil. We start by looking
at the share of royalties in the cost structure of rms. Royalties represent a signicant share in
22the cost of services (60%) and other business services (10%) and thus we expect these sectors
to be the most signicantly impacted by IPR retaliation. Indeed, we nd that IPR retaliation
increases the output of both services ($148 million) and other business services ($12.1 million).
The output of most other sectors are negatively impacted in Brazil.
5.3 Welfare impacts
It has been pointed out that authorizing trade retaliation as a remedy against a prohibited
trade barrier (export subsidies in this case) seems somewhat of a dilemma in the context of an
organization (WTO) whose overall objective is trade liberalization (Bown and Pauwelyn, 2010).
Moreover, equivalence between the damage and the retaliation as awarded by the WTO does
not guarantee equivalence in terms of welfare eects (Anderson, 2002).
This subsection is aimed to explore the welfare impacts of Brazil's retaliation plan. In
addition we are able to isolate the eects of trade retaliation from the eects of IPR retaliation
(see Table 6).
23Table 4: Volume Changes in Private Consumption ($mil)
Trade retaliation IPR retaliation
United States Brazil United States Brazil
Agriculture 0.05 -0.45 -1.06 1.38
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 0.00 -0.13 -0.02 0.15
Plant-based bers 0.61 -2.71 -0.05 0.15
Mining -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Food products -0.39 -0.72 -3.34 4.75
Vegetable, oils and fats -0.06 -0.25 -0.13 1.16
Dairy products -0.17 -0.55 -1.43 2.17
Other agricultural products -3.10 -4.03 -5.84 9.20
Beverages and tobacco products -1.53 -0.38 -2.70 2.36
Textiles -1.28 -1.21 -1.67 1.20
Wearing apparel -4.71 -1.73 -4.59 3.10
Manufactures -8.65 -0.39 -10.00 5.97
Chemical, rubber, plastic products -6.05 -3.47 -7.05 7.54
Metal products -0.48 -0.13 -0.55 0.67
Motor vehicles and parts -8.68 -1.71 -8.93 8.63
Transport equipment nec -0.81 -0.06 -1.12 0.51
Electronic equipment -3.78 -1.18 -3.18 4.24
Machinery and equipment nec -4.44 -0.86 -4.87 2.50
Manufactures nec -4.84 -0.68 -4.28 2.81
Royalty services -0.06 0.01 -0.05 5.12
Other business services -1.03 -0.78 -3.19 19.97
Services -52.98 -3.20 -171.53 88.03
Total -102.39 -24.59 -235.59 171.63
Source: Authors' simulations
24Table 5: Volume Changes in Output ($mil)
Trade retaliation IPR retaliation
United States Brazil United States Brazil
Agriculture -15.25 0.26 6.18 -29.56
Vegetables, fruit and nuts -1.17 2.29 0.60 -0.72
Plant-based bers -26.71 21.47 0.32 -0.64
Mining 26.26 -14.54 4.54 -14.46
Food products 10.76 -19.52 1.91 -21.97
Vegetable, oils and fats -0.66 -2.23 1.14 -6.40
Dairy products -3.26 2.65 -1.13 2.01
Other agricultural products -21.36 10.17 -1.01 4.96
Beverages and tobacco products 0.70 -1.34 -2.03 2.31
Textiles -27.77 14.79 7.52 -7.29
Wearing apparel 2.01 0.20 1.75 1.54
Manufactures 79.22 -32.92 48.38 -96.06
Chemical, rubber, plastic products -99.61 55.61 56.39 -50.77
Metal products 12.36 3.53 14.89 -18.52
Motor vehicles and parts 27.38 -12.11 17.07 -15.76
Transport equipment nec 41.61 -11.27 26.21 -29.27
Electronic equipment 32.62 2.19 41.67 -7.68
Machinery and equipment nec 24.63 22.84 77.33 -56.99
Manufactures nec 2.34 4.65 5.13 0.13
Royalty services -0.60 -0.74 1.77 2.49
Other business services 11.01 -5.46 5.95 12.19
Services -22.89 -38.56 -193.49 148.08
Total 51.59 1.97 121.12 -182.39
Source: Authors' simulations
25Table 6: Welfare decomposition ($USmil)
Trade retaliation IPR retaliation Total
AE ToT INV Total AE ToT INV Total AE ToT INV Total
United States 2.04 -91.86 -35.58 -125.40 -12.37 -289.10 -3.66 -305.13 -10.32 -381.03 -39.26 -430.62
Brazil -51.63 27.66 -6.18 -30.14 23.55 277.95 -9.78 291.72 -28.05 305.58 -15.97 261.56
South America 3.91 8.63 -0.71 11.83 2.17 -2.78 -0.83 -1.43 6.09 5.86 -1.53 10.41
EU27 countries -3.80 13.46 12.29 21.95 -7.86 -1.06 5.56 -3.36 -11.66 12.41 17.86 18.61
China -1.19 4.18 9.02 12.00 -0.82 5.52 -0.94 3.76 -2.02 9.71 8.09 15.78
India 0.31 1.22 2.44 3.97 -0.18 -0.64 1.98 1.16 0.13 0.58 4.43 5.14
Rest of Asia 1.87 9.60 8.64 20.11 0.39 4.36 -0.33 4.42 2.26 13.97 8.32 24.54
Africa 0.67 3.65 1.37 5.69 -0.34 -0.73 1.44 0.36 0.33 2.92 2.81 6.06
AustraliaNZ 0.32 1.76 1.05 3.13 0.11 0.93 0.70 1.74 0.43 2.69 1.76 4.88
Rest of World -2.75 21.70 7.65 26.60 -4.47 5.50 5.85 6.88 -7.22 27.22 13.51 33.51
Source: Authors' simulations. Decomposition into Allocative eciency (AE), Terms of Trade (ToT) and Capital Goods Eect (INV)
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6Overall welfare impacts of Brazil's retaliation plan for the world as a whole are negative
(-$50.1 million). We nd that the only loser is the US (-$430.6 million), whereas Brazil gains
$261.5 million in terms of welfare. The rest of the regions' welfare gain adds up to $118.9
million, with EU27 and Asia being the main beneciaries. A closer look at the decomposition
of total welfare eects16 shows that the main driver of the US's welfare losses are signicant
deterioration of its terms of trade (-$381 million), adding to a small loss of allocative eciency
(-$10.2 million) and negative capital goods eect (-$39.2 million). For Brazil on the other hand
there are signicant contributions to the increase in national welfare arising from improvement
in terms of trade ($305.5 million), but there is an allocative eciency loss (-$28 million).
Is trade retaliation equivalent with "shooting oneself in the foot" from the point of view the
retaliating country? Results show that indeed, trade retaliation results in a welfare loss of -$30.1
million for Brazil. This loss is mainly driven by a signicant allocative eciency loss of -$51.6
million as a result of imposing more distortions (higher taris). 26.2% of this eciency loss arises
in cotton sector, 15.8% in chemicals and 14.9% in machinery. Meanwhile, we nd a moderate
improvement in terms of trade of $27.6 counterweights the eciency loss. In addition, trade
retaliation results in welfare losses in the US as well (-$125.4 million) resulting from deterioration
of terms of trade of -$91.8 million in addition to negative capital goods eect. All other regions
benet from trade retaliation against the US.
We nally turn to the impacts of IPR retaliation. First, note that the rents used to exogenize
the export price of US royalty exports to Brazil directly impact the welfare of the representative
households in the US. More specically, as the US representative household bears the impact of
negative rents of the IPR retaliation of $-287.4 million equivalent with 0.002% of total income.
Compared to trade retaliation that hurt both the complainant and the respondent, we nd that
IPR retaliation benets Brazil (welfare gain of $291.7 million) but hurts the US (welfare loss
of -$305.1 million). There are signicant improvements in terms of trade in Brazil of $277.9
million mainly due to the fall in the price of royalties imported from the US. On the other hand,
terms of trade in the US deteriorate by $289.1 million governed by the fall in the export price
of royalties to Brazil.
To sum up, if Brazil had not been allowed to retaliate in the form of suspension of intellectual
property rights, the impact of trade retaliation alone would have been negative, a case of shooting
oneself in the foot to shoot at the other person's foot.
16For detailed description of welfare decomposition in GTAP see Hu and Hertel (2001).
276 Conclusion
The Framework Agreement that went into eect June 21, 2010 secured a deal between the US
and Brazil in the nine year long upland cotton dispute, a deal that would avert the imposition
of countermeasures against the US worth $829 million.
This paper explored the impacts of a no deal between the US and Brazil. As awarded by a
WTO dispute settlement panel, Brazil would have been entitled to $591 million in retaliatory
sanctions in goods sectors and $238 million in intellectual property and services sanctions.
While trade retaliation does not pose any challenges with respect to quantifying its impacts
in an applied general equilibrium framework, implementing IPR retaliation required us to modify
the underlying model.
The framework we develop is unique in the sense that it provides the possibility for quan-
tifying intellectual property related issues in a framework that is consistent with international
accounting standards and computable general equilibrium modelling.
The overall impact of Brazil's retaliation plan has a negative impact on world welfare. How-
ever, we nd that the only loser is the US (-$430.6 million), whereas Brazil gains $261.5 million
in terms of welfare. The welfare eects of the retaliation plan are close but not equal to the
$829 million awarded as retaliatory amount by the WTO to Brazil (the gain of Brazil and the
absolute value of the loss of the US amounts to $682 million or 82% of the amount awarded
by the WTO). Finally, has Brazil not been allowed to retaliate in the form of suspension of
intellectual property rights, the impact of trade retaliation alone would have been negative for
both Brazil and the US, a case of shooting oneself in the foot to shoot at the other person's foot.
28Table 7: List of US products subject to increased taris in Brazil
Nr. HS8 Code GTAP HS8 Code Description Current Retaliatory
1 1001.90.90 WHT Wheat and meslin 10% 30%
2 0802.21.00 V F Fresh or dried hazelnuts 6% 26%
3 0802.31.00 V F Fresh or dried walnuts 10% 30%
4 0802.32.00 V F Fresh or dried walnuts 10% 30%
5 0806.20.00 V F Dried grapes 10% 30%
6 0808.20.10 V F Fresh pears 10% 30%
7 0809.20.00 V F Fresh cherries 10% 30%
8 0809.40.00 V F Fresh plums 10% 30%
9 5201.00.20 PFB Cotton, not carded 6% 100%
10 5201.00.90 PFB Other types of cotton 6% 100%
11 9102.11.10 OME Wrist-watches 20% 40%
12 0504.00.13 OAP Guts of swine 8% 28%
13 0402.10.10 MIL Milk and cream 28% 48%
14 0404.10.00 MIL Whey and modied whey 28% 48%
15 1502.00.11 CMT Fats of bovine 6% 26%
16 1507.90.90 VOL Other soya-bean 10% 30%
17 1514.11.00 VOL Low erucic acid 10% 30%
18 1514.19.10 VOL Low erucic acid 10% 30%
19 4011.10.00 CRP New pneumatic tyers 16% 32%
20 4011.20.90 CRP Other new pneumatic tyers 16% 32%
21 0303.51.00 OFD Frozen Herrings 10% 30%
22 2005.20.00 OFD Potatoes, prepared 14% 34%
23 2009.90.00 OFD Mixtures of juices 14% 34%
24 2103.20.10 OFD Tomato ketchup 18% 38%
25 2103.90.91 OFD Preparations for 18% 38%
26 2106.10.00 OFD Protein concentrates 14% 34%
27 2106.90.30 OFD Food supplements 16% 36%
28 2106.90.50 OFD Sugar-free chewing gum 16% 36%
29 2106.90.90 OFD Other food preparations 16% 36%
30 2303.20.00 OFD Beet-pulp 6% 26%
31 7113.19.00 OFD Articles of jewellery 18% 36%
32 9021.10.20 OFD Splints 4% 14%
33 9021.39.80 OFD Other articial parts of body 14% 28%
29Nr. HS8 Code GTAP HS8 Code Description Current Retaliatory
34 2202.90.00 B T Other non-alcoholic beverages 20% 40%
35 5203.00.00 TEX Cotton, carded or combed 8% 100%
36 5208.21.00 TEX Plain woven fabrics 26% 100%
37 5209.32.00 TEX Woven fabrics of cotton 26% 100%
38 5703.20.00 TEX Carpets 35% 60%
39 5903.90.00 TEX Textile fabrics 26% 48%
40 6303.92.00 TEX Curtains, incl. drapes 35% 60%
41 6307.90.10 TEX Other made-up textiles 35% 60%
42 6307.90.90 TEX Other made-up textiles 35% 60%
43 6116.10.00 WAP Gloves 35% 60%
44 6203.42.00 WAP Men's or boys' trousers 35% 100%
45 6204.62.00 WAP Women's or girls trousers 35% 100%
46 4908.90.00 PPP Other transfers decalcomanias 16% 32%
47 2905.11.00 CRP Methanol 12% 22%
48 2929.10.21 CRP Isomer mixtures 14% 28%
49 3003.90.55 CRP Medicaments 14% 28%
50 3004.20.19 CRP Medicaments 8% 14%
51 3004.20.79 CRP Other medicaments 8% 14%
52 3004.39.39 CRP Medicaments 8% 14%
53 3004.40.90 CRP Other medicaments 8% 14%
54 3004.90.49 CRP Other medicaments 8% 14%
55 3005.10.90 CRP Other adhesive dressings 0% 12%
56 3006.10.90 CRP Other sterile surgical catgut 12% 22%
57 3303.00.20 CRP Toilet waters 18% 36%
58 3304.10.00 CRP Lip make-up 18% 36%
59 3304.99.10 CRP Beauty creams 18% 36%
60 3304.99.90 CRP Other beauty preparations 18% 36%
61 3305.10.00 CRP Shampoos 18% 36%
62 3305.90.00 CRP Other preparations 18% 36%
63 3306.10.00 CRP Dentifrices 18% 36%
64 3306.90.00 CRP Other preparations 18% 36%
65 3307.10.00 CRP Pre-shave, shaving 18% 36%
66 3307.20.90 CRP Other personal deodorants 18% 36%
67 3307.90.00 CRP Other depilatories 18% 36%
68 3401.19.00 CRP Other soap 18% 36%
30Nr. HS8 Code GTAP HS8 Code Description Current Retaliatory
69 3402.90.39 CRP Other surface-active prep. 18% 36%
70 3923.30.00 CRP Carboys, bottles 18% 36%
71 8212.10.20 FMP Non-electric razors 18% 36%
72 8212.20.10 FMP Safety razor blades 18% 36%
73 8703.21.00 MVH Motor cars 35% 50%
74 8703.23.10 MVH Motor cars 35% 50%
75 8703.24.10 MVH Motor cars 35% 50%
76 8703.24.90 MVH Motor cars 35% 50%
77 8703.33.10 MVH Motor cars 35% 50%
78 8711.50.00 OTN Motorcycles 20% 40%
79 8903.92.00 OTN Motorboats 20% 40%
80 8903.99.00 OTN Other vessels 20% 40%
81 8471.90.12 ELE Bar-code readers 12% 22%
82 8517.12.31 ELE Portable telephones 16% 32%
83 8518.10.90 ELE Other microphones 20% 40%
84 8518.21.00 ELE Single loudspeakers 20% 40%
85 8518.22.00 ELE Multiple loudspers 20% 40%
86 8518.30.00 ELE Headphones and earphones 20% 40%
87 8518.50.00 ELE Electric sound ampliers 20% 40%
88 8521.90.90 ELE Other video recording 20% 40%
89 8525.80.19 ELE Other television cameras 20% 40%
90 8525.80.29 ELE Other digital cameras 20% 40%
91 8527.21.90 ELE Other radio-broadcast receiver 20% 40%
92 8528.49.29 ELE Other colour monitors 20% 40%
93 8418.40.00 OME Freezers, upright 20% 40%
94 8433.11.00 OME Mowers for lawns 18% 36%
95 8506.80.90 OME Other primary cells, batteries 16% 32%
96 8516.60.00 OME Other ovens 20% 40%
97 9004.10.00 OME Sunglasses 20% 40%
98 9008.30.00 OME Other image projectors 18% 36%
99 9018.32.19 OME Other tubular needles 16% 32%
100 9018.39.10 OME Other needles 16% 32%
101 9403.70.00 OMF Furniture of plastic 18% 36%
102 9603.21.00 OMF Tooth brushes 18% 36%
Source: Resolution Nr. 15, March 15, 2010 of the Chamber of Foreign Trade of Brazil
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32Table 8: Sectoral and regional aggregation
Sectors Description
AGR Agriculture




VOL Vegetable, oils and fats
MIL Dairy products
OFD Other agricultural products




CRP Chemical, rubber, plastic products
FMP Metal products
MVH Motor vehicles and parts
OTN Transport equipment nec
ELE Electronic equipment
OME Machinery and equipment nec
OMF Manufactures nec
ROY Royalty services









ASIA Rest of Asia
AFR Africa
AUN Austarlia and New Zealand
ROW Rest of the World
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